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Hannah Arendt’s well-known examinations of the problem of evil are not contradictory 
and they are central to her corpus. Evil can be banal in some cases (Adolf Eichmann) 
and radical (the phenomenon of totalitarianism) in others. But behind all expressions 
of evil, in Arendt’s formulations, is the imperative that it be confronted by thinking 
subjects and thoroughly historicized. This led her away from a view of evil as radical 
to one of evil as banal. Arendt’s ruminations on evil are illuminated, in part, by 
concerns that she shared with her fellow New York intellectuals about the withering 
effects of mass culture upon individual volition and understanding. In confronting the 
challenges of evil, Arendt functioned as a “moral historian,” suggesting proﬁtable ways 
that historians might look at history from a moral perspective. Indeed, her work may 
be viewed as anticipating a “moral turn” currently afoot in the historical profession. 
Soon after her book Eichmann in Jerusalem was published in 1963, Hannah 
Arendt faced a hornet’s nest of controversy for her strong moral judgments 
and engagement with the problem of evil. Arendt had certainly made some 
controversial moral judgments. First, she condemned the Judenra¨te, the Jewish 
councils formed during the Holocaust that, in her opinion, were guilty of 
collaboration with the Nazis. Second, she found Adolf Eichmann, who helped 
to organize the logistics of the Holocaust, to have been a mundane bureaucrat 
whose evil was located in his thoughtlessness, rather than in any demonic intent. 
With regard to Eichmann she coined the phrase “the banality of evil,” a concept 
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that seemed far removed from the monumental horrors of the Nazi era that she 
had earlier in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) described as a “radical evil.”1 
“I know that the souls of our six million martyrs [Jewish Holocaust victims] 
whom you desecrated,” wrote J. Baron to Arendt, “will swarm about you day 
and night; they will give you no rest.”2 In the New York Times review that 
had instigated Baron’s letter, Judge Michael A. Musmanno damned Arendt for 
presenting Eichmann in a favorable light and for making Jewish leaders into 
perpetrators rather than victims of the Holocaust.3 Even old friends turned on her. 
Norman Podhoretz, editor of the inﬂuential journal Commentary, condemned  
her “manipulation of the evidence” and “perversity of brilliance.”4 
Hannah Arendt was controversial, to be sure, as an analyst of totalitarianism 
and in her judgments about Eichmann. Sometimes she was shoddy as a historian; 
she could be overbearing as a moral philosopher. Unlike the historian, Arendt 
1 An excellent place to begin for information on Arendt is Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah 
Arendt: For Love of the World (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982). 
For a strong but nuanced defense of Arendt’s work, especially on totalitarianism, see 
Stephen J. Whitﬁeld, Into the Dark: Hannah Arendt and Totalitarianism (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1980). Also excellent are Dagmar Barnouw, Visible Spaces: Hannah 
Arendt and the German-Jewish Experience (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1990); Jeffrey C. Isaac, Arendt, Camus, and Modern Rebellion (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992). Helpful for her philosophy are Margaret 
Canovan, The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt (New York and London: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1974); idem, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Lisa Jane Disch, Hannah Arendt and the 
Limits of Philosophy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994); George Kateb, 
Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984); Dana 
Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1996); Dana Villa, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
2 J. Baron to Hannah Arendt, 25 May 1963, Hannah Arendt Papers, Library of Congress, 
Adolf Eichmann File, online edition: http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/arendthtml/ 
MharendtFolder PO2.html. 
3 The review was by Judge Michael A. Musmanno, “Man with an Unspotted Conscience,” 
New York Times Book Review, 19 May 1963, 1, 40–41. Arendt’s reply, New York Times Book 
Review, 23 June 1963, 4. For her earlier “A Reporter at Large” coverage of the trail, see The 
New Yorker, issues for  16, 23 Feb. 1963; 2, 9, 16 March 1963. 
4 N. Podhoretz, “Hannah Arendt on Eichmann: A Study in the Perversity of Brilliance,” 
in idem, Doings and Undoings: The Fifties and after in American Writing (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1964), 334–53, 337. A vociferous attack on problems in Arendt’s 
research is Jacob Robinson, And the Crooked Shall Be Made Straight: A New Look at the 
Eichmann Trial (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1965). Another 
correspondent, writing from Holland, asked Arendt, “How can you write about something 
[the Holocaust] you have not suffered yourself?” Mrs Lakmaker to Arendt, 22 Oct. 1964, 
Hannah Arendt Papers, Library of Congress, Adolf Eichmann File, online edition. 
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was not sufﬁciently careful to moderate her interpretative needs to the resistances 
of the facts. She sometimes practiced her historical analysis at a meta-level, 
uncomfortable with nuances that undermined her generalizations. At her best, 
however, she labored to bring her metaphysical and moral speculations down 
to earth. And she was engaged in two undertakings of great importance. First, 
her work suggests that historians and philosophers need not operate at cross-
purposes. Second, she beckons historians to join her in analyses of evil. 
Historians are of course most comfortable on the terra ﬁrma of established 
facts, no matter how much postmodernists may problematize that term. In 
addition to their trusty empiricism, historians are generally hesitant to render 
strong judgments, lest they be accused of moralizing, or of allowing present 
ideals to be applied, perhaps anachronistically, to the past, with its different 
cultural contexts. Yet the historian and the moral philosopher are both exemplary 
storytellers. Historical narratives are adept at illuminating moral challenges. 
Historians highlight possible beginnings and endings, roads taken and rejected, 
contexts near and far. Moreover, the manner in which historians craft a narrative 
and organize materials is full of implicit moral judgments. Even a traditionalist 
historian such as Richard J. Evans recognizes that historians, while they graze 
among the facts, also make moral judgments, albeit without heavy-handed 
“expressions of moral outrage.”5 Moral philosophy, in turn, although sometimes 
burdened by its admonitions and abstractions, works best when, like history, it 
allows for interpretation of concrete facts with attention to a variety of frameworks 
for understanding.6 
But philosophers have been more willing than historians to grapple with the 
signiﬁcant problem of evil, perhaps the central problem in moral philosophy. 
Before 9/11 brought the vocabulary of evil back into our conversation, American 
studies scholar Andrew Delbanco bemoaned how Americans had lost their sense 
of Satan and evil.7 Arendt, as a moral philosopher and historian, devoted twenty 
5 For Arendt on historians see her sometimes off-key remarks in “Understanding and 
Politics,” in Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954: Uncollected and Unpublished 
Works, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1994), 320 ff. On narrative 
and morality see Richard Vann, “Historians and Moral Evaluations,” History and Theory 
43 (Dec. 2004), 3–30. Richard  J.  Evans,  In Defense of History (New  York: W. W. Norton,  
2000), 52. On how postmodernist historians intertwine morality and history see Hayden 
White, “Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,” in idem, The Content of the Form: 
Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1987). 
6 Disch, Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy, 1–19. 
7 A. Delbanco, The Death of Satan: How Americans Have Lost the Sense of Evil (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995). As will be clear from this essay, Delbanco omits many 
strenuous American engagements with evil and metaphysical issues. Inga Clendinnen 
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years to thinking about evil. Arendt’s focus on evil connected her to the post-
Second World War New York intellectual milieu, although philosophers fail to 
make this connection. More signiﬁcantly, I ﬁnd her famous shift, from thinking 
about evil as radical to thinking about it as banal, to be a movement more com­
plementary than contradictory. While evil is sometimes banal in its public face 
and intent, it cannot be divorced from thinking and acting subjects.8 Evil can be 
demonic or radical, as in Hitler or Stalin, but it still must be anchored in history.9 
With conﬁdent and complex steps, Arendt walked into the subject of evil. It 
was, in the aftermath of the Holocaust and the emergence of totalitarianism, the 
burden of her time. In so doing, Arendt bequeathed a legacy for historians through 
claims that historians “are made restless” by talk of “Satan” and evil. I. Clendinnen, 
Reading the Holocaust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 23, 65, 104. 
8 My thesis on the complementarity of Arendt’s forms of evil comes closest to that of 
Richard J. Bernstein. But I contend that ideology plays a more major role in Eichmann 
than Arendt maintained. See R. J. Bernstein, “From Radical Evil to the Banality of Evil: 
From Superﬂuousness to Thoughtlessness,” and “Evil, Thinking, and Judging,” both in 
idem, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 137–78; “‘Did  
Hannah Arendt Change Her Mind?’: From Radical Evil to the Banality of Evil” in Larry 
May and Jerome Kohn, eds., Hannah Arendt: Twenty Years Later (Cambridge and London: 
The MIT Press, 1996), 127–46. The literature on Arendt’s analysis of Eichmann and evil 
is immense. Excellent on Arendt as concrete with the notion of radical evil is Whitﬁeld, 
Into the Dark, 153. A key issue for many is whether Arendt shifted her views, and to what 
degree, from evil as radical to evil as banal. For an emphasis on the connections in her 
views see Hannah Fenichel Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt’s Concept of 
the Social (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 209–10. Arendt  
maintained that she had changed her view or emphasis; see Arendt to Mary McCarthy, 20 
Sept. 1963, in  Between Friends: The Correspondence of Hannah Arendt and Mary McCarthy, 
1949–1975, ed. Carol Brightman (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1995), 148. Another 
issue is whether Arendt’s presentation of Eichmann was a defense of her teacher and 
lover Martin Heidegger. For a convincing take on this see Richard Wolin, Heidegger’s 
Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Lowith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), esp. 52–62. On her Eichmann book as not 
representing a general philosophical position on evil but rather a concrete expression of 
it within a historical individual, see Dana Villa, “Conscience, the Banality of Evil, and 
the Idea of a Representative Perpetrator,” in idem, Politics, Philosophy, Terror: Essays on 
the Thought of Hannah Arendt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 39–60. For  
contemporary attacks on Arendt see Lionel Abel, “The Aesthetics of Evil: Hannah Arendt 
on Eichmann and the Jews,” Partisan Review 30 (1963), 211–30; Marie Syrkin, “Hannah 
Arendt: The Clothes of the Empress,” Partisan Review 30 (1963), 344–52; and  idem, “Miss  
Arendt Surveys the Holocaust,” Jewish Frontier 30 (May 1963), 7–14. 
9 Adi Ophir, The Order of Evils: Toward an Ontology of Morals, trans. Rela Mazali and Havi 
Carel (New York: Zone Books, 2005); R. J. Bernstein, The Abuse of Evil: The Corruption of 
Politics and Religion since 9/11 (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2005). 
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her willingness to engage with the thick reality of evil, and by her developing 
conceptualizations about it. She recognized the demonic and metaphysical 
qualities of evil, which threatened to place it outside the historical vision. But she 
also sought to render evil as something concrete and as something superﬂuous 
(as excess and as unnecessary). Evil must be surveyed as it has existed in the 
past so that it can be understood today. In sum, as Israeli philosopher Adi Ophir 
emphasizes, evil—as cruelty or humiliation—is anchored in social realities and 
capable of being combated. It is as much stuff for historians and philosophers as 
it is for preachers and politicians.10 
∗ ∗ ∗  
Arendt, in her engagement with totalitarianism and the Holocaust, faced 
difﬁculties in navigating the still unsettled waters and emerging meaning 
around the event. In many ways, the Holocaust resisted any easy narration of 
triumphalism or defeatism. While the total destruction of European Jewry had 
been stalled, it had come horribly close to achieving Hitler’s totalitarian dream 
of exceeding the limits of possibility. A narrative of the Allied victory of reason, 
democracy, and morality victorious over Axis irrationality, dictatorship, and 
amorality was available after the war, but it missed much of the complexities of 
modernity, mass politics, and psychology that occupied Arendt’s ﬁeld of vision. 
Also, she composed Origins, one of the more ambitious and probing works of 
the recent horror, before much serious scholarly work had been done on the 
Holocaust. She did proﬁt from some earlier work but she was, largely, setting out 
in a host of new and controversial directions.11 
Adding to the problems faced by Arendt in Origins, and even more in 
Eichmann, was her ambiguous status as both outsider and insider in relation 
to the Holocaust and its emerging communities of survivors. As her fellow exile 
Theodor Adorno put it, all exiles are, “without exception, mutilated.”12 This sense 
10 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 141 ff.; Judith N. Shklar, Ordinary Vices (Cambridge and London: Harvard University 
Press, 1984), 7–44. I would tie the work of David A. Hollinger to this imperative, given 
his emphasis on expanding the “circle of we” and cosmopolitanism; see D. A. Hollinger, 
Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism (New York: Basic Books, 1995). 
11	 Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933–1944 
(New York: Octagon Books, 1963). Neumann’s inﬂuence is also apparent in the work of 
his student Raul Hilberg. See R. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1961). For Hilberg on Neumann see R. Hilberg, The Politics of Memory: 
The Journey of a Holocaust Historian (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), 61–6. 
12 T. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reﬂections from Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott  
(London: Verso, 1984), 33. 
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of mutilation was heightened depending upon one’s own relationship with the 
Holocaust. Arendt was not, in a strict sense, a survivor, having escaped in 1933 to 
France, before coming to the United States in 1941. Fellow exile and historian Raul 
Hilberg noted the reality of a “rank order” among Holocaust victims. Survivors, 
those singed by the ﬁre of the horrors, spoke with authenticity and power; those 
who escaped before the juggernaut had fully rolled were semi-privileged but 
nonetheless distanced observers.13 Arendt got out just in time to avoid the worst, 
but she lived in the shadow of that trauma, and it shaped her. Yet she was, 
by dint of her German birth and brushes with German authorities, an insider. 
More importantly, Arendt was a witness. She had lived through this event of 
monumental proportions to such a degree that, as philosopher Margaret Canovan 
and others note, she made her reﬂections about the rise of totalitarianism and its 
challenge to philosophy, morality, and democracy the key themes of her immense 
body of work.14 
Born into comfortable circumstances in 1906, Arendt left Germany as a 
mature woman, already formed by her philosophical education with Martin 
Heidegger and Karl Jaspers, as well as by her activities in the anti-Nazi movement. 
The Reichstag Fire of 1933 burned itself in Arendt’s memory as a moment of 
“immediate shock,” the point at which her sense of well-being as a German of 
Jewish ancestry was shattered.15 At one point soon after, she was arrested in Berlin 
for involvement in anti-Nazi actions (she had been compiling excerpts of Nazi 
anti-Semitic utterances). She was released from jail after the fatherly intercession 
of a police ofﬁcer. Later, while in exile in Paris, she did relief work for Jewish 
refugees before escaping from the advancing armies of the Third Reich to safe 
haven in the United States. Arendt brought with her the conviction that emotion 
and ideology polluted reason, along with a willingness to range far and wide in 
her attempts to uncover the causes for the calamity then transpiring.16 
Arendt settled in New York City, along with her husband Heinrich Blu¨cher, 
and she soon assumed a leading position among the Jewish intellectuals huddled 
around publications such as Partisan Review and Commentary. 17 Arendt and 
13 Saul Friedlander, “Trauma, Transference and ‘Working Through,’” History and Memory 4 
(1992), esp. 39–55 
14 Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation, 7; Richard J. Bernstein, “The Origins of 
Totalitarianism: Not History but Politics,” Social Research 69 (Summer 2002) 391. 
15 Arendt, “‘What Remains?, The Language Remains’: A Conversation with Gunter Gaus,” 
in Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954: Uncollected and Unpublished Works, ed.  
Jerome Kohn (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1994), 5. 
16 Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt, 115–63. 
17 See George Cotkin, “The Tragic Predicament: Post-War American Intellectuals, 
Acceptance and Mass Culture,” in Jeremy Jennings and Anthony Kemp-Welch, eds., 
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her new comrades shared anti-Stalinist politics, support for most United States 
actions in the Cold War, wariness (to put it mildly) of mass culture, and a 
conviction of the value of a tragic sensibility. Her friend, writer Alfred Kazin, 
heralded Arendt’s “intellectual courage before the moral terror the war had 
willed to us.”18 She pushed her new companions to think more philosophically 
by pointing some of them towards Heidegger’s work and by being a citadel for 
them of the best in European culture. 
Arendt and the New York intellectuals wanted to deal with evil in a realistic 
manner. A willingness to think about evil and the tragic sense of life had been 
gaining vigor at least since the early 1920s in the conversation of intellectuals. In 
part this was a response to the horrors of the First World War and the challenges 
of modernity. Theologian Reinhold Niebuhr had long intoned the centrality of 
sin and evil in human existence, while editorialist Walter Lippmann stressed 
how “the acids of modernity” had contributed to a tragic modern malaise.19 
After the Second World War, in the halls of Columbia University, according to 
political scientist Ira Katznelson, a tragic sensibility informed the work of political 
scientists and historians, ranging from David Truman to Richard Hofstadter.20 
Many non-academic intellectuals, forged in the crucible of disappointed 
dreams of Marxian revolution and working-class redemption, found in a tragic 
sensibility, tinged with evil, a logical antidote to the excesses of earlier utopian 
dreams. When Dwight Macdonald contemplated the horror of extermination 
camps and the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and when theologian 
Will Herberg wondered about the fate of Jews in the modern world following the 
Holocaust, both of them acknowledged the power of a tragic perspective; they 
Intellectuals in Politics: From the Dreyfus Affair to Salman Rushdie (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1997), esp. 253. 
18 A. Kazin, New York Jew (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 195. Also  idem, Writing Was 
Everything (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1995), 125–30. 
19 On Niebuhr see Richard Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography (San Francisco: Harper and 
Row, 1987). For Lippmann see idem, A Preface  to  Morals  (New York: The Macmillan Co., 
1929), 51 ff. While older terms entered into the vocabulary of intellectuals, newer terms, 
ranging from genocide to human rights, also gained currency, marks of a generation 
searching for meaning. On the new terms see the suggestive remarks in Alan Brinkley, 
“Legacies of World War II,” in idem, Liberalism and Its Discontents (Cambridge and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1998), 94–110. 
20 Ira Katznelson, Desolation and Enlightenment: Political Knowledge after Total War, 
Totalitarianism, and the Holocaust (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 107–51. 
Also David S. Brown, Richard Hofstadter: An Intellectual Biography (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006), 122–3. 
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had faced evil in their time.21 New York intellectuals joined with Arendt, despite 
the fact that most of them were resolutely secular, to engage with evil, as a concept 
and a reality, thus entering into that “frontier of metaphysics or mysticism” that 
T. S. Eliot had warned against following the First World War.22 While the New 
Yorkers’ embrace of tragedy and evil often fed into the power and presumptions 
of American foreign policy, it could also question deeply held ideals of progress 
and conﬁdence. Evil in the chastened hands of many former Marxist radicals also 
posited human limitation and the propensity to act in both an irrational and a 
nefarious manner.23 
Arendt, then, worked within a coterie and context that supported her own 
concern with evil. Her view in 1950 was that since the Holocaust was an “altogether 
unprecedented phenomenon,” a unique evil, masked by an “unreality which 
surrounds the hellish experiment,” the traditional concepts and methods of social 
science would be stymied.24 Evil must be examined. Arendt was determined to 
demonstrate how the Nazis had, through ideological fanaticism and bureaucratic 
rationales, reduced Jews to a species of non-being, making it all the easier for 
them to be eliminated. This action, this willingness to think that anything was 
possible and that people could be rendered superﬂuous, would form the core of 
her analysis of the nature of totalitarian, and especially Nazi, evil. 
Arendt published both her books when the Holocaust was relatively peripheral 
to the lives and minds of Americans. Even her fellow New York intellectuals, while 
increasingly intrigued by Judaism and drawn towards the tragic, did not focus on 
the event.25 It was, as Michel Foucault and Ian Hacking would put it, an object that 
21 On Macdonald’s anger see D. Macdonald, “The Bomb,” politics 2 (Sept. 1945), 257–60; idem, 
“The Two Horrors,” politics 2 (May 1945), 130–31; Will Herberg, Judaism and Modern Man: 
An Interpretation of Jewish Religion (New York: Farrar Straus and Young, 1951), 3–25. 
22 T. S. Eliot, “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” in idem, Selected Essays, 1917–1932 (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1932), 11. 
23 For more on the tragic sensibility see George Cotkin, Existential America (Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). Excellent on the tragic perspective 
is Richard Wightman Fox, “Tragedy, Responsibility, and the American Intellectual, 1925– 
1950,” in Thomas P. Hughes and Agatha C. Hughes, eds., Lewis Mumford, Public Intellectual 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 323–37. Also, on the break of intellectuals with 
Marxism, see Howard Brick, Daniel Bell and the Decline of Intellectual Radicalism: Social 
Theory and Political Reconciliation in the 1940s (Madison and London: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1986). 
24 Arendt, “Social Science Techniques and the Study of Concentration Camps,” in Arendt, 
Essays in Understanding, 232–43. 
25 Robert B. Westbrook, “The Responsibility of Peoples: Dwight Macdonald and the 
Holocaust,” Holocaust Studies Annual 1 (1983), 35–63. Also Alexander Bloom, Prodigal 
Sons: The New York Intellectuals & Their World (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), 329 ff. 
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had not yet come into being or been constituted.26 Jewish Americans, especially 
survivors or those related to survivors, experienced the Holocaust as trauma, 
often met by repression, silence, or engagement.27 Only in the early 1960s, for a 
host of reasons, did the Holocaust enter fully into the American conscience.28 
Historian Peter Novick emphasizes that the trauma of the Holocaust was cast 
aside and transformed into a narrative that foreshadowed and defended the 
state of Israel.29 However, Arendt was hardly an enthusiastic supporter of Israeli 
ethnocentrism and military policies, and her writing resists appropriation into 
any Zionist morality tale. She was after bigger, more ambitious game—to grab 
hold of a synoptic account of the horror that she had witnessed in full from the 
safe shores of America.30 
Arendt disdained metaphysical explanations even as she was placing evil 
and morality centrally in her analysis. While she failed to banish metaphysics 
sufﬁciently from her initial conception of evil, she shifted as already noted, away 
from evil as something radical in the 1940s and  1950s to evil as produced in  
an often banal manner in the early 1960s. Most controversially, as we will see, 
Arendt also addressed the politically and morally charged question of the role 
and responsibility of Jews in their own demise in Eichmann in Jerusalem. 
Milton Himmelfarb, witty editor of Commentary magazine, once famously 
stated, “No Hitler, No Holocaust.”31 Arendt did not share his opinion. Indeed, in 
Arendt’s two works on the Holocaust, Hitler is at best a peripheral ﬁgure. In this 
approach, Arendt was hewing the line then favored by institutional historians and 
social-science methodology. The reasons for this conscious omission relate to the 
26 Ian Hacking, Historical Ontology (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 
2002), esp. 1–5. 
27 Kirsten Fermaglich, American Dreams and Nazi Nightmares: Early Holocaust Consciousness 
and Liberal America, 1957–1965 (Waltham, MA.: Brandeis University Press, 2006). 
28 For an excellent overview of the extent of Holocaust consciousness before the explosion of 
attention see Lawrence Baron, “The Holocaust and American Public Memory, 1945–1960,” 
Holocaust and Genocide Studies 17 (Spring 2003), 62–88. 
29 While Novick presses the connection between Holocaust remembrance and the politics 
of Israel and the Jews, it does not diminish the complexity of the situation. P. Novick, The 
Holocaust in American Life (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifﬂin, 1999). On the initial 
reception of news about the Holocaust see Robert H. Abzug, Inside the Vicious Heart: 
Americans and the Liberation of the Nazi Concentration Camps (New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1985), which includes many of the images published at that time. 
30 On Arendt’s relation to Zionism and Israel see the essays in Steven E. Aschheim, ed., 
Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 149–202. 
31 M. Himmelfarb, “No Hitler, No Holocaust,” Commentary 77 (March 1984), 37–43. For  
a strong rejection of Arendt’s refusal to deal with Hitler and Stalin see Kateb, Hannah 
Arendt, 54–5. 
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imperatives of Arendt’s narrative and moral project. For Arendt, the depiction 
of totalitarianism and the Holocaust depended on analysis of large ideas and 
events: romanticism, imperialism, and anti-Semitism. And once totalitarianism 
had risen to power, it then demanded institutional analysis in order to understand 
how it functioned and maintained power through terror. Thus Arendt tried to 
combine large ideas with attention to details and “concrete things,” both in 
Origins and in Eichmann. 32 Focusing on Hitler, she feared, would open up the 
ﬂoodgates of the demonic. He might be viewed, over time, as the aesthete of evil 
and thereby gain a cultish following. 
Others, however, pushed to recognize Hitler’s central role in the making of 
history. Before her book on totalitarianism appeared in 1951, philosopher and New 
York intellectual Sidney Hook had written inﬂuentially about how individuals’ 
roles in history should never be ignored, without slighting the importance of 
historical context. Hook responded to old issues of agency and determinism in 
Marxian theory.33 Arendt was unconcerned with this debate, but she composed 
her work at a moment when fascination with Hitler threatened to swamp 
attention to historical forces and contingency. British historian Hugh Trevor­
Roper’s The Last Days of Hitler (1947) had been a sensationalistic bestseller, and 
soon after Arendt’s work had been published, Alan Bullock’s Hitler: A Study 
in Tyranny added to the fascination with Hitler.34 Moreover, to place Hitler 
center stage would have forced Arendt to confront the problem of evil within 
a larger-than-life human being. She preferred, in Origins, to deal with evil as a  
manifestation of forces associated with modernity and corrosive of tradition.35 
When she ﬁnally did peer into the mind of a criminal, as in her analysis of Adolf 
Eichmann, she reduced evil to a function of his thoughtlessness and presence 
within an institutional structure of authority. 
32 On her concern with facts see Arendt to McCarthy, 20 May 1962 and 16 Sept. 1983, in  
Between Friends, 131, 146. 
33 S. Hook, The Hero in History: A Study in Limitation and Possibility (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1955; ﬁrst published 1943). For an excellent analysis of Hook’s journey through Marxism 
see Christopher Phelps, Young Sidney Hook: Marxist and Pragmatist (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1997). 
34 H. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler (New York: Macmillan, 1947); A. Bullock, Hitler: 
A Study in Tyranny (New York: Harper, 1952). The front ﬂap of Trevor-Roper’s book asked, 
“Is Hitler Dead?”, while promising “many vivid scenes.” A good study of the reception of 
Hitler studies in the decade after the war is needed. 
35 In perhaps her fullest discussion of Hitler she emphasizes simply his charisma and certitude 
as a leader of the masses, and she does not employ the term “evil.” See Arendt, “At Table 
with Hitler,” in Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 285–96. 
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Arendt began in the mid-1940s to think long and hard about the problem 
of evil, and it would be central to her major work of 1951, The Origins 
of Totalitarianism. She published the book at the right historical moment 
of mounting Cold War tensions and ideological skirmishing. For Arendt 
totalitarianism represented a radical, and evil, break from previous political and 
social systems, in its administration, ultimate illogic, and terror. In a sense, 
totalitarianism was partly an outgrowth of modernization, especially in its 
emphasis on technologies of destruction, ideology of scientiﬁc racism, and ability 
to undermine traditional notions of moral responsibility.36 Totalitarianism also 
emerged from other factors: the rise of anti-Semitism, the stateless position of 
Jews, the decline of the nation state, the resurrection of racial thinking and the 
development of the modern masses, imperialism, and nationalism. Only after 
close to four hundred pages on these events did she get to the moral heart of her 
evil subject—how totalitarian regimes seek to consign to “holes of oblivion” its 
victims’ bodies and memories. 
Arendt was wary of ﬁrsthand testimony about the Holocaust because its 
veracity had not been strained through the sieve of time and trauma.37 At 
those times when she does refer to accounts of the concentration camps, 
it is for background, rather than for thick description or emotionally 
wrenching testimony.38 While there is some truth that Arendt’s presentation 
is unsentimental, it is also awash in powerful metaphors and hyperbole. Notions 
such as “holes of oblivion” or the “fabrication of corpses” serve as a way for Arendt 
to make clear the radical originality of the Holocaust and totalitarianism. But 
she remained wary of using the testimony of those who suffered most closely the 
36 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000). 
On how modernist utopianism and state planning can combine to produce horrid ends 
see James C. Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998). Emphasis on 
modernization, technology of killing, and the rise of bureaucracy tends, in moral terms, 
to deﬂect emphasis from the active role of perpetrators and to feed into functionalist 
interpretations of the Holocaust. 
37 Jeremy D. Popkin, “Holocaust Memories, Historians’ Memoirs,” History and Memory 15 
(Spring/Summer 2003), 49–84. 
38 See Bettelheim’s inﬂuential “Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations” (1943), 
in B. Bettelheim, Surviving and Other Essays (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 48– 
83; David Rousset, The Other Kingdom, trans. Ramon  Guthrie (New York:  Reynal  
and Hitchcock, 1947); Eugene Kogon, The Theory and Practice of Hell: The German 
Concentration Camps and the System behind Them, trans. Heinz  Norden  (New  York:  
Farrar, Straus & Co., 2006). Hereafter, page citations for Rousset appear in the text. 
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outrage of totalitarianism. She found in survivor testimony a certain uniformity 
that suggested to her a scripted rather than a thoughtful engagement with the 
experience of evil.39 There is not a single, if I am not mistaken, eyewitness account 
that could be described as emotionally compelling in Origins. 
When Arendt composed Origins she lacked access to the mountain of survivor 
and perpetrator testimonies available today and to the subsequent ﬂood of sec­
ondary accounts. Yet, as her footnotes clearly indicate, she had sufﬁcient examples 
of survivor testimony near to hand. For instance, she had the example and 
writings of David Rousset. A fellow philosopher who had before the war taught 
in a French lyce´e, Rousset found himself deposited in a series of concentration 
camps for resistance-related activities. Arendt was familiar with his account, and 
he helped her to understand the chaos and illogic of a concentration camp world 
where “everything is possible.” His account is an intimate memory of horrors 
experienced, described, and comprehended. Unlike Arendt, Rousset pulls no 
punches in representing this “world like a dead planet laden with corpses” (168). 
Evil abounds in the concentration camp. He describes how the 
Sonderkommando (special units of Jews charged with pushing victims into and 
then taking them out of the gas chamber) upon opening the gas chamber doors 
confront a “wall of corpses, inextricably intertwined.” In another passage, he 
relates how inmates with “a hideous hunger in their bellies,” in a conﬁned space, 
“will massacre each other for a half an ounce of bread, for a bit of elbow room” 
(60–61). In this truly “monstrous” world, guards are “posted over the dead” with 
orders to kill those [inmates] who eat the scrawny, fetid ﬂesh of the cadavers” (40). 
Rousset was the philosopher returned from hell; he rejects the narrative and 
conceptual constraints favored by Arendt. In her political philosophy, Arendt 
always celebrated pluralism (“Plurality is the law of the earth”), the variety of 
viewpoints engaging one another in a cosmopolitan world of stirring debate and 
openness.40 But Arendt never sufﬁciently confronted in her work the bodies and 
voices of the victims except in her abstract, analytical manner. If she had, then 
perhaps she might have been able to join her analysis with a rendering of the world 
of the concentration camp made ﬂesh. To do this is, as Elaine Scarry points out, to 
hear the screams of the survivors (even if those screams cannot have “referential” 
content) and, as Susan Sontag came to realize, to put images of hell into a context.41 
39 Arendt, “Social Science and the Concentration Camps,” in Arendt, Essays in 
Understanding, 243. On Arendt’s style see Disch, Limits of Philosophy, 112–21. 
40 Arendt, “Appearance,” in Arendt, The Life of the Mind: One Volume Edition (New York 
and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), 19. Also Arendt, The Human Condition 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1958). 
41 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and the Unmaking of the World (New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 5. On the contextualization of images as a 
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Arendt recognized totalitarian evil as something radically new in history, a 
sustained and manic attack against humanity. Borrowing a phrase from Rousset, 
Arendt stated that totalitarian regimes believed that “everything is possible,” and 
they aligned themselves with the deterministic forces of History and Nature.42 
The danger of such identiﬁcations, or of revolutionary virtue without limitations, 
became a key theme of her On Revolution (1963). As she put it, “The evil of Robe­
spierre’s virtue was that it did not accept any limitations.”43 Fanatical marches of 
personal, philosophical, and/or natural necessity made human beings superﬂu­
ous, as it had snuffed out Jews. Its insane logic applied to the Nazis themselves, 
hence the Go¨tterda¨mmerung central to their apocalyptic vision. Erasure of the Jews 
began with minor, often absurd, sanctions designed to erode their legal and polit­
ical rights as individuals, as well as their identities as Germans.44 Once stripped 
of their rights and identity, without any connection to the nation or polity, the 
superﬂuous person is tossed easily into the concentration camp, that “terrible 
abyss that separates the world of the living from that of the living dead” (CR 441). 
Totalitarian evil sought to erase all traces of its victims.45 In the whirlwind of 
Nazi fanaticism and ideology, Jews were stripped of connection to the familiar 
objects of everyday life, beginning with job, wealth, political rights, and even living 
place. Ultimately, their few connecting threads to the past—photographs, lockets, 
and rings—are ripped from them upon entry into the concentration camp. 
Arendt compellingly stated, “Like the new type of murderer who kills his victims 
for no special purpose of self-interest, we may not be aware that anybody has been 
murdered at all if, for all practical purposes, he did not exist before” (CR 434). 
Conditions in the camps, the grinding insanity and cruelty—the “excremental 
assault,” as Terrence Des Pres phrased it—corrodes the essence of being as an 
individual tied to a group or tradition; all that the individual can think about is 
method of communication see Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: 
Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2003), 29 ff. 
42 Arendt, “Concluding Remarks,” in The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Co., 1951), 433. Hereafter, citations to this edition appear in the text as CR. Other 
citations to this work in the  text  refer to a later edition,  The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966). 
43 Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking, 1963), 86. 
44 On the attempt to make humans superﬂuous see Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A 
Reinterpretation, 12 ff. A powerful account of these various rules and regulations regarding 
Jews, and those “Aryans” married to Jews, is Victor Klemperer, I Will Bear Witness, 1942– 
1945: A Diary of the Nazi Years, trans. Martin Chalmers (New York: The Modern Library, 
2001). 
45 Arendt to McCarthy, 20 Sept. 1963, in  Between Friends, 147–8. The moral implications 
of this are examined in Susan Neiman, “Theodicy in Jerusalem,” in Hannah Arendt in 
Jerusalem, 87 ff. 
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survival.46 Like the powers in Orwell’s chilling Nineteen Eighty Four, totalitarians 
seek to control the future, in part, by securing the past. The totalitarian need 
to rewrite history, especially as evidenced by the Soviet desire for confession on 
the part of its victims, is central for Arendt. Through confession, even if the 
individual is innocent in “reality,” he or she accepts the call of the Party “to play 
the role of the criminal,” thus becoming in effect “objectively . . . the enemy of 
the Party” and conﬁrming the original charges lodged against him (CR 473). 
In this totalitarian nightmare the very foundations of moral judgment and 
historical truth are destroyed. In part, Arendt is aware that morality is in short 
supply in the concentration camps, run according to a monumental illogic and 
feeding upon chaos as a new rule of order. Her concern is with the morality of 
the perpetrators, in contrast to the morality of its victims. Here Arendt proves 
more insightful about the larger logic and less willing to judge the inmates 
than her fellow survivor and contemporary, Bruno Bettelheim.47 As a resolute 
secularist, Arendt maintains that the notion of a God-given, biblical morality has 
been banished by the forces of modernity and the horrors recently unleashed. 
Leibniz had attempted to secure God’s place in a world of terrible earthquakes, 
for example, by proclaiming that, ultimately, all is right with the world, that this is 
the best of all possible worlds. For Arendt, in her presentation of the totalitarian 
world as illogical, irrational, and bloodthirsty, even the Ten Commandments 
were inadequate in the face of the horror. No longer could the myths of Judeo-
Christianity, in her view, secure authority. Beyond the decimation of religious 
ideals, Arendt argued that totalitarianism had sent “three thousand years of 
Western Civilization” “toppling down over our heads.” In its radical insanity, its 
fantastical view of the world, and its rejection of rationality and of all “implied 
beliefs, traditions, standards of judgment,” the totalitarian machine, in effect, 
had ended the traditional conversation of philosophy and morality (CR 434). 
Arendt no doubt agreed with survivor Primo Levi’s famous observation, “there 
is Auschwitz, so there cannot be God.”48 
46 Yet Des Pres upholds that acts of morality, humanity, and comradeship are possible, even 
in these conditions. Des Pres, The Survivor: An Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1976). In the same vein, see Tzvetan Todorov, Facing the 
Extreme: Moral Life in the Concentration Camps, trans. Arthur Denner and Abigail Pollak 
(New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996). 
47 For Bettelheim’s famous analysis, often revised and reprinted, of the concentration camp, 
see “Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations” (1943), in Surviving and Other 
Essays, 48–83. For a devastating picking-apart of his argument and its foundations in 
observation and experience see Richard Pollak, The Creation of Dr. B: A Biography of 
Bruno Bettelheim (New York: Touchstone, 1997), 116–26, 362–7 
48 P. Levi and Ferdinando Camon, Conversations with Primo Levi, trans. John Shepley  
(Marlboro, VT: The Marlboro Press, 1989), 68. 
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“[T]he problem of evil,” wrote Arendt in the Partisan Review in 1945, “will  be  
the fundamental question of postwar intellectual life in Europe.” Arendt initially 
engaged this problem in a lengthy review of Denis de Rougemont’s The Devil’s 
Snare (1944). She criticized his theological speculations, condemning him for 
a Gnosticism that posited “an eternal ﬁght between God and the Devil” and 
for permitting undue metaphysical speculation to distance him from reality.49 
However, Arendt agreed with much in Rougement. He contended that Hitler 
was not the demonic principle incarnate, but rather someone wearing a “satanic 
insignia,” not apart from humanity. Hitler, in essence, personiﬁed the potential 
evil in all of us. Rougemont, with Niebuhr and Arendt, contended that evil resides 
within each of us, ready to emerge “under the cover of wretchedness or fatigue 
or some temporary disequilibrium,” such as an economic depression.50 
Rougemont anticipated the path that Arendt traveled over the next twenty 
years in her complex and productive confrontation with evil. To be sure, she 
remained consistent in refusing to discuss Hitler out of a fear of making him into 
an icon of evil. Arendt was at her best in trying to understand how evil appeared 
under particular conditions, rather than as some abstraction or metaphysical 
51presence.
In the mid-1940s Arendt could not shake her shivering sense that the Nazi 
moment had deﬁed tried and true methods of comprehension. The problem 
for Arendt was to frame the challenge of evil without falling into mysticism or 
metaphysics, or making evil into something resembling an aesthetic choice. She 
wrote her philosophical mentor Karl Jaspers that Nazi inhumanity had opened 
up an “abyss” in understanding, “and I don’t know how we will ever get out of it.” 
Indeed, Arendt’s dilemma went beyond simple problems of morality. If the Nazis 
were guilty of crimes pervasively perverse against people who were conspicuously 
innocent, then could our traditional moral and legal categories enter into play? 
The guilt of the Nazis “explodes the limits of the law; and that is precisely what 
constitutes their monstrousness.”52 
Jaspers rejected Arendt’s initial tendency to view evil as metaphysical, perhaps 
beyond comprehension. Instead, he posited that evil had a “prosaic triviality” 
49 Arendt, “Nightmare and Flight,” in Essays in Understanding, 133–5. 
50 Denis de Rougemont, The Devil’s Snare, trans. Hakkon Chevalier (Washington, DC: 
Bollingen, 1944), 60, 86. Also Arendt’s “Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility” 
(1945), in Essays in Understanding, 128–31 
51 Here lies Arendt’s afﬁnity with some of the emphases found in Ophir, The Order of Evils, 
11–14, on the particular appearances and contexts of evil, and of its preventability. 
52 Arendt to Jaspers, 17 Aug. 1946, in  Hannah Arendt/Karl Jaspers Correspondence, 1926–1969, 
trans. Robert and Rita Kimber (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), 54. 
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rather than any taint of “satanic greatness.”53 He worried that any “hint of myth 
and legend” would feed into a sort of pagan idolatry of Nazi evil. While Arendt 
agreed with him on this point, in the mid-1940s, she was unprepared to adopt 
it—the horrendous memory of Nazi atrocities against humanity still burned too 
menacingly. She held onto the perhaps common-sense view of differentiating 
between a murderer who kills out of passion or self-interest and the Nazi machine 
of destruction which erected “factories to produce corpses” out of a utopian and 
illogical fanaticism designed to “eradicate the concept of the human being.”54 
This, rather than any sense of “prosaic triviality,” was what constituted evil in 
its full ﬂowering and what made it radical. But she did not recognize that both 
notions of evil need not cancel one another out. 
Although she employed the term “evil” sparingly in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, its presence informed nearly every page of the text, and it came 
already wrapped up in a long philosophical tradition. Many have pondered how 
Arendt’s invocation of the terms “radical” and “absolute” evil are connected to 
Kant’s classic discussion.55 Kant did set up the categories and language for most 
subsequent discussions of the problem of evil. In brief, Kant posits that evil is not 
inherent in human nature; he rejects any notion of original sin. Evil arises when 
the individual will chooses an option; without freedom, there is no choice. Evil 
comes when the individual chooses without obedience to moral law. For Kant, 
the key is the intention of the actor, the desire of the individual to act, or not 
to act, in accord with practical reason. Hence evil is the weakness of our selﬁsh 
nature, of our  desire  to  act as if we were God, which  undermines our  sense of  
limits and altruism.56 Radical evil, in Kantian terms, “corrupts the ground of all 
maxims,” it represents something wickedly new, a “perversity of the heart.”57 
But Arendt’s use of the term “radical evil” differs from Kant’s, as philosopher 
Richard J. Bernstein explains. For Kant, radical evil constitutes man’s break from 
the moral law; there is no sense in Kant of man choosing with full knowledge 
to become demonic or evil.58 Arendt goes well beyond Kant’s formulation, in 
53 Jaspers to Arendt, 19 Oct. 1946, in  Hannah Arendt/Karl Jaspers Correspondence, 62. 
54 Arendt to Jaspers, 17 Dec. 1946, in  Hannah Arendt/Karl Jaspers Correspondence, 69. 
55 For the inﬂuence of Kant on Arendt see Jerome Kohn, “Evil and Plurality: Hannah Arendt’s 
Way to The Life of the Mind,” in Twenty Years Later, 150–51. 
56 On Kant’s notion of evil see Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative 
History of Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 64 ff.; Richard 
Bernstein, “Radical Evil: Kant at War with Himself,” in idem, Radical Evil: A Philosophical 
Interrogation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 11–45. 
57 Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt 
H. Hudson, 2nd edn (La Salle, IL: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1960), 32; original  
emphasis. 
58 Bernstein, “Radical Evil,” 43. 
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part, because after Auschwitz she had encountered actions that would have been 
incomprehensible to Kant’s Enlightenment sensibility. Moreover, Arendt’s view 
of radical evil began where Kant’s notion left off. For Kant, evil depended upon 
freedom, upon contingency and choice. Totalitarianism had demolished them, 
along with spontaneity. In this world, evil had assumed a new face. 
In her darkest moments, reﬂecting upon the production of totalitarianism 
as “the burden of our time,” Arendt fell into her own hole of interpretative 
“oblivion.”59 Accept for the sake of argument her conclusion that totalitarian 
evil was radical—a form of terror previously unknown and unimagined in 
human history. The evil of the crusades, cruciﬁxions, slavery, pogroms—the 
list is endless—pales in the face of modern totalitarian evils, as recounted by 
Arendt. At least with past evils, as she understood them, there was logic and 
self-interest at the core of the crimes. Totalitarian evil, while it upheld an ideal 
of transformation, was essentially aimless, an end in and of itself. Totalitarian 
evil also proved to be ineffable as a result. It was beyond the law, beyond 
reason, beyond punishment since the law and punishment depended upon 
moral assumptions that totalitarianism virtually transcended. Totalitarianism’s 
“perverted will” (457–9) had transported it “beyond good and evil,” in the least 
sympathetic reading imaginable of Nietzsche’s terms. 
Thus Arendt had painted herself into a narrow corner. If the crimes of 
totalitarianism were as original and immense as she averred, then could they be 
anything other than demonic? She never hesitated to describe them throughout 
Origins and articles as “monstrous”—as well they were. But her use the term 
“demonic” might place them outside the realm of explanation and the march 
of worldly events. The demonic can resist laws of nature or the wills of men. 
Even strong structures of representative democracy and public debate, it seemed, 
were futile against this demonic entity. Such was clearly not Arendt’s intent. 
For example, she purposely ignored any substantial focus on the leaders of 
totalitarianism because to pay attention to them would have forced her into the 
realm of the demonic, of the individual infused with evil. She also refused to 
discuss at any length Hitler and Stalin to avoid romanticizing them or elevating 
them into heroes of the demonic. But they can be seen in demonic proportions 
without forcing them into an interpretative abyss. For these leaders were also part 
and parcel of a political, social, and cultural world that nurtured them in part, and 
that they also sought to destroy or reconﬁgure. Arendt was onto something when 
she remarked about the mysterious nature of evil as something not “humanly 
understandable.” Everything need not be understandable on such terms, but it 
can be interpreted in more or less convincing fashion. Arendt’s frustrations grew 
“The Burden of Our Time” was the original title intended for Origins. That title was used 
for the edition of Origins published in the United Kingdom. 
59 
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to the point where, just after publication of The Origins of Totalitarianism, she 
proclaimed, “What radical evil is I don’t know.”60 
∗ ∗ ∗  
The trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961 for the murder of millions of Jews afforded 
Arendt excellent opportunity to revisit unresolved issues about evil. In June 1960 
Arendt wrote her friend, writer Mary McCarthy, that she was “half toying” with 
getting a commission to cover the trial.61 Much to her delight, The New Yorker 
magazine sent her as its representative. Arendt knew the stakes in the Eichmann 
trial were high. “The Eichmann trial has us all stirred up,” she wrote to Jaspers, 
“It will, in its totality, become a major symbol of the life of the mind today.”62 
Arendt’s report transformed Eichmann into a “major symbol” for a new 
form of evil—”the banality of evil,” which became the controversial subtitle of 
her volume, Eichmann in Jerusalem. As noted earlier, the book was extremely 
controversial for a number of reasons. First, her coverage of the trial helped 
to usher in an era of Holocaust awareness.63 Second, many readers felt that 
Arendt had belittled Eichmann’s responsibility as a leading Nazi war criminal 
and that her “banality of evil” thesis downplayed the monstrous nature of the 
evil that had rained down upon the Jews. Third, Arendt dismissed the testimony 
of survivors as unreliable and formulaic. Finally, building upon the recently 
published research by Raul Hilberg in his The Destruction  of  the European Jews  
(1961), Arendt devoted a few pages to unfavorably presenting Jewish councils as 
cooperative with the Nazis in the elimination of the Jews. 
Arent’s Eichmann was a relatively innocuous fellow, a dedicated bureaucrat, 
and a man without any independence of mind. She now embraced Jaspers’s 
earlier claim that evil was “prosaic” and “banal.” And, as we shall see, her new 
conception of evil well ﬁtted what she understood as the numbing effects of 
mass culture on the individual’s ability to think morally and complexly. If her 
initial formulation of the problem of totalitarian evil was that it was demonic 
and metaphysically elusive, the problem with the “banality of evil” thesis was that 
evil was now ubiquitous. “Therein lies the horror and,” wrote Arendt, “at the 
same time, the banality of evil.”64 Even if evil did not beat in the heart of every 
60 Arendt to Jaspers, 4 March 1951, in  Hannah Arendt/Karl Jaspers Correspondence, 166. 
61 Arendt to McCarthy, 20 June 1960, in  Between Friends, 81–2. 
62 Arendt to Jaspers, in Hannah Arendt/Karl Jaspers Correspondence, 1 April 1961, 432. 
63 Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin, 1999). 
64 Quoted in Jerome Kohn, “Evil and Plurality,” Twenty Years Later, 174. For similar 
perceptions of Eichmann see Jochen von Lang, ed., Eichmann Interrogated: Transcripts 
from the Archives of the Israeli Police, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
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mindless bureaucrat, the upshot of Arendt’s analysis for many was that under 
certain conditions individuals might well act no differently than had Eichmann. 
The solution to this new face of evil seemed to be a call to think, to live an 
active life of the mind so that when the individual confronted momentous, moral 
choices, such a confrontation would include the moral reﬂection necessary to 
deﬂect evil possibilities. 
Arendt was in league with many New York and European intellectuals in using 
mass culture as an analytic concept to explain evil. Although they often differed 
about how capitalism and mass culture were related, and about the value of 
Marxian analytic tools for understanding mass culture, all shared a genuine fear 
that traditional culture and its institutions were being devalued and destroyed by 
mass culture. Most famously, social theorist Erich Fromm—no less than Arendt 
in Origins—argued that modern alienated masses had become easy prey for fascist 
fantasies of power and possibility. While this fear of mass man was more muted in 
postwar America, it was a common way of comprehending anti-intellectualism, 
middle-brow culture’s presumed hegemony, and the allure of populist and fascist 
movements among the masses. 
Arendt, beginning in 1947, became close friends with David Riesman, a key 
theorist of culture. The paradox of mass culture, as Riesman recognized, was that it 
helped to destroy traditional bonds of community, thereby increasing individual 
loneliness and alienation. At the same time, mass culture offered alternative 
modes of belonging—through consumption, cooperation, ideology, and new 
collective identities. No one examined mass culture more fully, and subtly, in 
this period than Riesman. He had read and critiqued, and been inﬂuenced by his 
reading in 1949 of, a draft manuscript of Arendt’s Origins. She, in turn, greatly 
respected his work, The Lonely Crowd  (1950). She agreed with his early hypothesis 
that those individuals that were generally indignant about various issues were 
fodder for the totalistic critique of fascism.65 Riesman brilliantly described a 
change in the national character, from an inner-directed to an other-directed 
personality. From a highly rigid and individualistic sense of self in the nineteenth 
century, Americans had moved to a personality type that was dependent less 
on family or internal certitude than on peer approval, mass advertising, and 
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consumerism. Sinister readings could be placed upon this analysis, and Arendt 
herself reacted to Riesman’s other-directed personality by seeing it as akin to 
her own descriptions of the alienated masses in the period before the rise of the 
Nazis.66 
While Arendt and Riesman were concerned with mass culture and its effects, 
other social theorists took their ideas, and joined them to the more hyper-critical 
views of Frankfurt School theorists, to suggest that mass culture was a distinct 
threat to American democracy and values. Thus fellow New York intellectuals 
Richard Hofstadter and Daniel Bell, shocked by the anti-intellectualism of the 
McCarthyites of the 1950s, saw lurking behind mass politics in the era signs 
of proto-fascism or at least populist mediocrity and paranoia. In the language 
of mass-culture critique, Hofstadter identiﬁed “rootlessness” as partly impelling 
the “pseudo-conservatism” of the period. Moreover, “Mass communications have 
aroused the mass man.” The implicit danger in this, as Hofstadter emphasized, 
was not a quick descent into totalitarianism. But he did fret that the arrival of 
mass man on the political and cultural stage in America would soon result in a 
weakening of political leadership and in cultural mediocrity.67 
Or, more tellingly, as in the case of Eichmann people followed orders because 
they were incapable of thinking deeply or of examining moral perplexities. 
They had, in this view, been trained to be nothing more than cogs in whatever 
machine wanted them, for whatever purposes it wanted served. Borrowing from 
the analysis of Theodor Adorno, Irving Howe described Donald Duck as “a 
frustrated little monster who has something of the SS man in him and whom we, 
also having something of the SS man in us, naturally ﬁnd quite charming.” In like 
fashion and in anticipation of Arendt’s emphasis on the deadening role of cliches´
in Eichmann’s mind, conservative social critic Ernst Van Den Haag found that 
1950s American culture was being overrun by “familiar cliche´s” that undermined 
thinking and diluted culture.68 
Thus the equation of mass culture with other-directedness, of mass culture 
with non-thinking, or thinking in cliche´s, was crucial for Arendt’s take on Adolf 
Eichmann. It helped her to frame evil in a way that made it non-demonic and 
intrinsically concrete; it also promised a solution for preventing the individual 
66 On Riesman and Arendt the best analysis is Wilfred M. McClay, The Masterless Self and 
Society in Modern America  (Chapel Hill and  London: The  University  of  North Carolina  
Press, 1994), 234–68. 
67 Hofstadter, “The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt” (1955), in Daniel Bell, ed., The New 
American Right (New York: Criterion Books, 1955), 69, 78–9. 
68 For a discussion of these ﬁgures, and citations for these quotes, see Cotkin, “‘The Tragic 
Predicament’,” 225. Arendt, along with Dwight Macdonald, was nearly singular among 
the New York Intellectuals in addressing the Holocaust. Westbrook, “The Responsibility 
of Peoples,” 35–63. 
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from plunging into evil actions. She presented Eichmann as a mere functionary, 
a man without qualities. She found him a “normal” or “average” man (26). 
However, when she had ﬁrst contemplated covering the trial, Arendt described 
Eichmann as “the most intelligent of the lot” of Nazis.69 As the trial progressed 
and she waded through the testimony, she concluded that Eichmann “was a 
buffoon.” It was all she could do to control her laughter about his self-inﬂated 
importance and cheerful wallowing in empty cliche´s, as she read the transcript 
of his interrogation.70 Moreover, Arendt argued that Eichmann was no fanatic, 
lacking even a hint of “insane hatred of Jews” or of ideological indoctrination (26, 
36). He was, in effect, modern mass man. A careerist, comfortable in the womb 
of the bureaucracy, Eichmann was like the individual that Arendt had described 
in an early essay, “Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility” (1945)—a man 
concerned with his family, fearful of unemployment, willing to follow orders, 
and capable of self-deception.71 
Arendt explained how Eichmann compartmentalized his life, practiced self-
deception, and denied playing any role in the killing of Jews. In some ways, Arendt 
presented Eichmann as the ironic apotheosis of the parvenu, the newcomer 
to power, the person who wears the garments of the bourgeoisie in the 
gaudiest fashion. Arendt—a self-proclaimed pariah against the weaknesses of the 
“Spiessburger” (the affected, ceremonious bourgeoisie)—hated him and those of 
his ilk.72 In addition, and in keeping with his bourgeois nature, Eichmann simply 
followed orders, moving the trains with their human cargo along more efﬁciently. 
He became a perfect example of a man doing his job, compartmentalized within 
the bureaucracy, unwilling to peer too closely at reality. He understood the 
trees but missed the forest. Critic Lionel Abel bellowed that Arendt’s Eichmann 
appeared  as  nothing  more  than “an  utterly replaceable  instrument . . . a mere  cog  
in the machine” of the bureaucracy of murder.73 
69 Arendt to McCarthy, 20 June 1960, in  Between Friends, 81. 
70 Arendt, “‘What Remains, The Language Remains,” 17. 
71 Arendt, “Organized Guilt  and Universal  Responsibility” (1945), in Essays in Understanding, 
129–30. 
72 The strongest presentation of this view is Walter Laqueur, “The Arendt Cult,” in Hannah 
Arendt in Jerusalem, 52, 63–4. For a more subtle view see Robert B. Pippen, “Hannah 
Arendt and the Bourgeois Origins of Totalitarian Evil,” in Alan D. Schrift, ed., Modernity 
and the Problem of Evil (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005), 
148–60. For an early description of the Eichmann “personality” linked with the bourgeois 
“modern type of man” see Arendt, “Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility,” in 
Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 130. 
73	 L. Abel, “The Aesthetics of Evil: Hannah Arendt on Eichmann and the Jews,” Partisan 
Review 30 (1963), 211. 
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Arendt recorded faithfully, rarely with any skepticism, Eichmann’s memory of 
events and of his role in them. He stated that he had only bumped up accidentally 
against the Holocaust. He had often visited Auschwitz, but its eighteen square 
miles presumably allowed him to miss the places where the killing went on (89). 
He had, however, seen on the Eastern Front mobile gas vans that were used to 
execute Jews. Eichmann protested, however, that “I hardly looked. I could not.” 
It “upset” him too much. He retreated back into his sense of duty and loyalty to 
Hitler, and to the shufﬂing of papers (82). 
Arendt as a moral historian judged Eichmann, even while she explained his 
“innocence” as a thoughtless human being. She never doubted that he deserved 
to be hanged. His actions were evil, even if his intentions were not. Hence the evil 
of Eichmann was judged by its results rather than its motivations.74 Eichmann 
was a banal man capable of doing great evil. 
Although Eichmann at the trial managed to invoke a close-to-the text 
description of Kant’s categorical imperative in his defense, claiming that he 
was following the moral law (as laid down by the Fu¨hrer), Eichmann missed the 
essential point. For Arendt, and for Kant, the point was that the individual chose 
only through the act of thinking, of judging possibilities. To act responsibly, one 
had to think in terms larger than oneself or blind devotion to someone like Hitler, 
who should never be viewed as synonymous with any moral order of things (22, 
49). 
Arendt greatly underestimated both Eichmann and his milieu. The notion 
that such a mediocre fellow could rise so high into the upper echelon of the Nazi 
killing machine strained credulity, as did her seconding of Eichmann’s contention 
that he was ideologically naive or disinterested. “What is most striking in Miss 
Arendt’s picture of Eichmann,” wrote Abel, “is her omission of any reference 
to the man’s ideology.”75 Thanks to the painstaking research of David Cesarani 
into Eichmann’s development and to Yaacov Lozowick into the bureaucracy of 
the Nazi security police, a different picture of Eichmann emerges. Eichmann 
jumped on the evil, ideological train of Nazism early and enthusiastically. He 
rose quickly in the bureaucracy, despite his limited education, and he enjoyed 
exercising his power and ﬁnding creative solutions to the essential problem of 
how to kill millions of Jews as efﬁciently and cheaply as possible. As Cesarani 
phrases it, Eichmann “was a knowing and willing accomplice to genocide.” He 
made choices; he knew what he was doing. And, at the same time, he learned, 
74 On the importance of this approach to Eichmann see S. Neiman, “Theodicy in Jerusalem,” 
in Aschheim, Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem, 77–81. 
75 Abel, “The Aesthetics of Evil,” 221. 
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evolved into a person willing and able to engage in genocide. There was nothing 
banal about him, his institutional setting, intentions, or actions.76 
Arendt also contradicted herself in her understanding of Eichmann as a banal 
bureaucrat, someone blindly and loyally following orders. As Albert Breton and 
Ronald Wintrobe have indicated, the Nazi murder machine was an immense and 
decentralized bureaucracy. In order to rise to a central position, as had Eichmann, 
one had to master a labyrinth of intrigue, to compete with other sections that were 
always seeking to increase their own power and authority. In such a dog-eat-dog 
reality, Eichmann’s emergence meant that he was both a brilliant player and a 
dedicated one.77 Arendt’s own evidence should have led her in this direction. In 
Origins she devoted many insightful pages to the bizarre Nazi bureaucracy, with 
its multiplication of ofﬁces, competing powers, vague orders, power struggles, 
and constant shifting of authority (399–420). She reiterated, albeit more brieﬂy, 
this same understanding in Eichmann in Jerusalem, ﬁnding “ﬁerce competition” 
in the bureaucracy. Clearly, her image of Eichmann as a rather normal, banal, 
cliche´-ridden individual failed to connect with his rather scandalous bureaucratic 
success in the Nazi killing machine. 
Why, then, did Arendt get so much wrong, and yet so much right, about 
Eichmann and evil? While she made great strides in adopting the concept of the 
banality of evil, to make it work in this particular situation she had to shoehorn 
Eichmann into it. In fact, Eichmann may have been many things, but he was not 
an ideologically impotent bureaucrat. But she got much right by bringing evil 
down to a concrete level as it might appear in the ﬁgure of the cliche´-ridden, 
unthinking bureaucrat. Had Eichmann been capable of strenuous thought, of 
confronting moral choices, then he, and others, might have been less prone to 
follow orders, to fail to see and appreciate the necessary plurality of the world. 
Thus the banality of evil that she evoked with Eichmann replaced the 
ineffability and potentially demonic metaphysics that lurked behind her earlier 
conception of radical evil. Evil had to be pulled down from the heights of the 
demonic to the lows of modern bureaucracy and thoughtlessness. The problem 
with different forms of demonism, as she had been lectured by Jaspers, was that 
it threatened to become almost beyond comprehension. And, of equal threat, 
the hugeness of demonism might be appealing, a way for some to transcend 
76 David Cesarani, Becoming Eichmann: Rethinking the Life, Crimes, and Trial of a “Desk 
Murderer” (New York: DaCapo Press, 2006), 6. Yaacov Lozowick,  Hitler’s Bureaucracies: 
The Nazi Security Police and the Banality of Evil, trans. Haim Watzman (London and 
New York: Continuum, 2000). Also Richard Overy, Interrogations: The Nazi Elite in Allied 
Hands, 1945 (New York: Viking, 2001), 360, where Dieter Wisliceny recalls being told by 
Eichmann not to be “sentimental” about orders to kill Jews. 
77 A. Breton and R. Wintrobe, “The Bureaucracy of Murder Revisited,” Journal of Political 
Economy 94/5 (1986), 905–26. 
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the mundane into a sense of greatness.78 Thus Arendt, in contrast, argued that 
Eichmann was a mediocrity rather than a ﬁgure of any demonic proportions. He 
could be condemned as a moral midget and a thoughtless clown, someone whose 
“talents” had been nurtured within the bureaucratic machine. Arendt had nailed 
an important reality of Eichmann and the phenomenon of “the banality of evil.” 
Her new conception, even if it did have aspects of being a mere “catchword,” 
as Gershom Scholem averred, did some heavy lifting for Arendt, and others 
that followed in her wake.79 Gone was any hint of a Devil fallen from grace, or 
of individuals seeking demonic powers. There was no aesthetic charge to evil. 
Instead, the banality hypothesis allowed evil to be situated in totally secular 
terms, as a function of everyday tasks done by individuals who refuse to make, or 
prove themselves to be incapable of making, moral decisions. Years later, Arendt 
summed up her view thus: “it was not stupidity but thoughtlessness” that was at 
the core of the evil committed by Eichmann.80 
Such thoughtlessness opened up a space for the solution to the problem of 
the banality of evil. As a moralist, Arendt believed that individuals must make 
choices, and good choices can arise only out of a strenuous process of thought. 
Thoughtlessness, as Arendt argued, was helpful to the successful functioning of 
the Nazi bureaucracy. “Cliche´s, stock phrases, adherence to standardized codes of 
expression and conduct” undermine thought and stymie moral judgments; they 
undermine our openness to “reality.”81 Perhaps. Certainly no one would want to 
argue against serious thought or confrontation with moral issues. But, as David 
Cesarani indicates, Eichmann did think, did choose to make himself into what he 
became, a “genocidaire.”82 If so, then such thinking mocks Arendt’s pretensions 
to the humane implications of thought and moral considerations. Eichmann, 
no less than Martin Heidegger (her philosophical mentor and one-time lover), 
then, was hardly thoughtless; he was a thinker that chose evil, after weighing the 
evidence and considering the implications of his actions. But this was a troubling 
78 Jaspers to Arendt, 19 Oct. 1946, Hannah Arendt/Karl Jaspers Correspondence, 62. 
79 G. Scholem, “‘Eichmann in Jerusalem’: An Exchange of Letters between Gershom Scholem 
and Hannah Arendt,” Encounter (Jan. 1964), 56. For the placement of this debate within 
the context of Jewish history see David Suchoff, “Gershom Scholem, Hannah Arendt, 
and the Scandal of Jewish Particularity,” Germanic Review 72/3 (1997), 57–76; Dan  Diner,  
“Hannah Arendt Reconsidered: On the Banal and the Evil in Her Holocaust Narrative,” 
trans. Rita Bradshaw, New German Critique 71 (Spring–Summer 1997), 177–90. 
80 Arendt, The Life of the  Mind, 3–4; original emphasis. On Arendt and plurality and 
thought as potentially able to overcome moral dilemmas see Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A 
Reinterpretation, 190 ff. 
81 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 4. 
82 Cesarani, Becoming Eichmann, 6, 11, 344–55. For this view as applied to Heidegger see Dana 
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conclusion, because it meant that those who did think and could ponder morality 
still chose evil. If so, then her plea for greater depth of thought might seem beside 
the point; that, she could not countenance. Moreover, there was no reason for 
Arendt to think in either/or terms concerning her two hypotheses of evil. Radical 
evil could coexist with banality, the one capturing a certain monumentality of 
evil, in intent and scale, and the other a mode of acting so as not to confront the 
reality of radical evil. 
∗ ∗ ∗  
How to deal with evil became another issue that Arendt dealt with in 
controversial fashion. In part, the trial of Eichmann was intended as a show, to 
point up how Israel now stood ready to defend Jews everywhere and every time. 
Accounts of resistance to the Holocaust on the part of Jews became sacred texts, 
anticipations of the state of Israel’s stance as defender of the Jews. The problem 
with this theme of heroic Jewish resistance, for Arendt, was that it erased a deeper 
historical reality, one that survivors were either not allowed to, or preferred not to, 
confront—the role of Jewish councils, the Judenra¨te, in cooperating with the Nazi 
ofﬁcials. Although she devoted less than ten pages to this issue, it would prove 
to be some the most controversial parts of her account. She wanted to balance 
the ledger, to demonstrate the “true dimensions” of the “totality of the moral 
collapse” (111). Borrowing heavily from Hilberg’s recent account, and picking 
up on themes that Bruno Bettelheim was pursuing at the same time, Arendt 
found that Jewish leaders had aided the Nazis.83 She did not peer deeply into 
the perplexing situation and the possibility of mixed motives, of what Primo 
Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, argues that it was Jewish traditionalism, the 
belief that all horrors will pass and that one should never make waves with the Gentiles, 
that allowed these leaders and millions of Jewish peasants to cooperate fully and willingly 
in their own destruction. Sufﬁce it to say, Hilberg’s interpretation of this aspect of the 
Holocaust has come under ﬁre. Indeed, even Arendt could be viewed as critical of it, since 
she remarks in Eichmann (9) that in the face of the tremendous force of the Nazis “no non-
Jewish group or people had behaved differently.” B. Bettelheim, “Freedom from Ghetto 
Thinking,” Midstream (Spring, 1962), 16–25. Strong arguments against the presentation 
of the Judenra¨te in Arendt and Hilberg are Isaiah Trunk, Judenrat: The Jewish Councils in 
Eastern Europe under Nazi Occupation (New York: Macmillan, 1972); Michael R. Marrus, 
The Holocaust in History (New York: Meridian, 1987), 113–21; Yehuda Bauer,  A History  of  
the Holocaust (New York: Franklin Watts, 1982), 155–67; Bauer,  Rethinking the Holocaust 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), 77–82; Abigail L. Rosenthal, “The 
Right Way to Act: Indicting the Victims,” in Alan Rosenberg and Gerald E. Myers, eds., 
Echoes from the Holocaust: Philosophical Reﬂections on a Dark Time (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1988), 149–62. 
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Levi had famously described as the “Gray Zone.”84 Instead, Arendt claimed that 
these leaders, such as Chaim Rumkowski in Ł ´ z, who renamed himself Chaim od´
I and issued stamps with his portrait and currency with his signature, acted as 
they had because they enjoyed their power, however illusory it ended up being. 
But was this not precisely the type of concern for motives and intentions that 
she had condemned in Eichmann? As to the argument that these leaders had 
acted morally within the murky limits of possibility and understanding, Arendt 
was disdainful. Dr Kastner in Hungary, Arendt related, became one of many 
“instruments of murder” for the Nazis; the truth was “gruesome.” Kastner had 
saved 1,684 people while helping the Nazis collect 476,000 others for their deaths. 
From Arendt’s perspective this was morally heinous, and she maintained that 
other choices did exist. The Jewish leaders should not have cooperated; “there 
would have been chaos and plenty of misery but the total number of victims 
would hardly have been” as large (111). 
∗ ∗ ∗  
Arendt’s work as a moral historian, then, however problematic in its 
particulars, combined judgment with explanation. Sometimes her judgments 
were harsh, sometimes they were simply mistaken. Too often she attempted to ﬁt 
her historical research into her preconceived notions.85 But in all of her work she 
highlighted moral issues, focused on individual agents and their responsibility for 
their actions, and upon the context(s) in which they make them. She also accepted 
the crunching reality of evil that still festered in the ashes of the Holocaust. She 
attempted to explain the forces that had brought evil forth into the world and 
how it had sought both the physical and historical extermination of a people. 
In tandem with the concerns of her fellow New York intellectuals about mass 
culture and wary of metaphysical and demonic explanations of evil, Arendt 
shifted her perspective on evil. She came to emphasize evil as largely a function of 
thoughtlessness, something that was at times banal in intent but horrendous in 
its consequences. At all times, Arendt upheld the responsibility of the individual 
to resist incorporation into the mass, to remain attuned to personal choice and 
responsibility in the formulation and pursuit of moral choices. This marked her 
work and inﬂuence as a moral historian. 
Hardly surprising, then, that Arendt would appeal to some in a generation 
coming of age in the 1960s, seething with antagonism against a world that often 
seemed imprisoned by the illogic of mutually assured atomic destruction and by 
84 P. Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (New York: Vintage 
International, 1989), 36–69. 
85 Cesarani, Becoming Eichmann, 344. 
489 hannah arendt and moral history 
the war in Vietnam. Psychologist Stanley Milgram’s experiments into how normal 
people would, upon orders given by authority ﬁgures, inﬂict punishment on 
innocent subjects, owed much to Arendt’s considerations of totalitarianism and 
evil. Many in the New Left in the 1960s embraced Arendt’s morally infused analysis 
and her conception of the banality of evil, based on a thoughtless following of 
orders.86 
Arendt deserves our attention as a helpful precursor to the moral turn afoot 
today in historical studies.87 Such a moral turn means that historians increasingly 
desire to employ concepts from moral philosophy to interrogate historical events 
while moral philosophers turn to history to ﬁnd ways of thickening their moral 
concepts.88 This can be seen, for example, in Harry S. Stout’s recent work, where 
he employs the concept of “just war” to examine the Civil War. While he ﬁnds 
the war justiﬁed on the part of the North (to maintain the Union and later to 
end slavery), he argues that the means employed by both sides, but especially 
by the North, in total war to have been immoral. And he seeks to understand 
86 Novick, The Holocaust in American Life, 136–7. S. Milgram,  Obedience to Authority (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1974). On Milgram see Thomas Blass, The Man Who Shocked the 
World: The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram (New York: Basic Books, 2004), esp. 75–130. 
Gerald E. Myers, “The Psychology of Man After Auschwitz,” in Rosenberg and Myers, 
Echoes, 311–13. For a New Left take on Arendt, linking Nazi totalitarianism with American 
hegemony, see Norman Fruchter, “Arendt’s Eichmann and Jewish Identity” (1965), in 
idem, For a New America: Essays in History and Politics from Studies on the Left, 1959–1967 
(New York: Random House, 1970), esp. 428–9. 
87 Perhaps a ﬁrst ﬂowering of this turn can be seen in Richard Wightman Fox and Robert B. 
Westbrook, eds., In the Face of the Facts: Moral Inquiry in American Scholarship (Cambridge: 
Woodrow Wilson Press and Cambridge University Press, 1998), esp. Introduction, 1–9. 
88 Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2001),  esp.  Part  Two,  “The  Moral Psychology of Waging  
War,” where  he  discusses both Hiroshima  and My Lai. H. S. Stout,  Upon the Altar of 
the Nation: A Moral History of the Civil War (New York: Viking, 2006). I agree with 
Allan Megill’s criticisms of Glover’s weaknesses as a historian. Megill also raises central 
issues that will confront any project of moral history. A. Megill, “Two Para-historical 
Approaches to Atrocity,” History and Theory 41 (Dec. 2002), 104–23. A. C. Grayling,  
Among the Dead Cities: The History and Moral Legacy of the WWII Bombing of Civilians in 
Germany and Japan (New York: Walker and Co., 2006). Stout’s views of just-war theory, 
and the application of it to concrete situations, was inﬂuenced by the important work 
of Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations 
(2nd edn, New York: Basic Books, 1992), where he discusses Sherman’s total war, America 
in Vietnam, and other examples of moral complexity. For a work that allows historical 
memory to be employed for moral lessons see Robert Jay Lifton, Death in Life: Survivors 
of Hiroshima (New York: Random House, 1967). For strong criticisms of Stout’s approach, 
see James M. McPherson, “Was It a Just War?,” The New York Review of Books, 23 March 
2006, 16–19. The  value of such a contretemps about  moral issues is that it raises large  and  
important questions, pointing to the conversation of morality as the key. 
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the underlying ideology of messianic mission, as preached from pulpits in both 
North and  South as a type  of  baptism in oratory  that preﬁgured  the  bloody  
reality of the war. Yet in applying moral concepts, either Arendt’s on banality or 
those of just war, historians should also look to how concepts must be revised, 
or at least reconsidered, in the face of historical complexities. Thus, while just-
war theory is no doubt correct in noting, in Kantian terms, that means should 
never be subsumed to ends, might certain historical situations “override” or 
question moral admonitions? Might situations of “supreme emergency,” to use 
philosopher Michael Walzer’s term, such as occurred after the crushing Union 
defeat at the Second Battle of Bull Run in 1862, warrant extreme and immoral 
means in order to save a just cause?89 Historians, and moral philosophers, in 
any event, are best served when afﬁxing blame or judgment is less central than a 
full and complex understanding about means and ends within speciﬁc historical 
contexts. This desire for complexity is at the heart of the “moral mind,” which 
Eichmann noticeably lacked and which Arendt celebrated. But as Arendt and 
others from her milieu, such as Lionel Trilling, realized, such a mind is the 
starting point for understanding and evaluation, as well as for sophisticated 
judgment attuned to contradiction and ambiguity.90 
89 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 251. Walzer notes that even if immoral actions are taken, they 
do not “override” the correctness of a moral response. Therein is the tragedy of action. 
90 L. Trilling, The Liberal Imagination (New York, 1953; ﬁrst published 1950), xi–xii, 9. 
